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Abstract 
Listed companies that successfully deceive investing public and issue false financial reports have been observed in the financial 
markets around the world. The consequences of this practice are devastating on the investing community as well as on the society 
as a whole. Sell-side security analysts, among other gatekeepers in the financial markets, have been criticized. They should 
examine financial data issued by listed companies to assure investing public about the reliability of published data. So, to 
understand how listed companies have succeeded in issuing fraudulent financial reports in the presence of gatekeepers such as 
sell-side analysts, a well-known fraud case was chosen, i.e. Enron Company.  -2001, the 
research paper examined how sell-
n 
of grounded theory Re-reporting was one of the main results generated through the analysis process.  It is meant by re-reporting 
is that analysts were re-reporting what had been reported by Enron without due analysis or scepticism. Additionally, based on the 
findings of the analysis and relevant literature, two propositions have been developed for further research. 
 
Keywords: Fruadulent financial reporting, sell-side security analysts, Enron; re-reporting, propositions. 
1. Introduction  
 
 The latest accounting scandals at the turn of the 21st century, particularly scandals in the U.S. markets, 
have battered global financial markets.  The scandals started with Enron Corp. in 2001, a prominent and influential 
case, which was then followed by other companies up to the present day (Kieso, Weygand, & Warfield, 2007; 
McClelland & Stanton, 2004; Palazzo & Rethel, 2008; Ribstein, 2002; Thapa & Brown, 2007; Zahn, Singh, & 
Singh, 2008), WorldCom Inc.(2002), Global Crossing Ltd. (2002), HealthSouth (2003), Refco Inc. (2005), Bernard 
L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (2008), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (2008) Satyam Computer Services 
Limited (2009) are some examples, (Benson, 2009; Bullock, Guerrera, Jenkins, & Sender, 2010; Giroux, 2008; 
Rockness & Rockness, 2005; Solomon, Mollenkamp, McKay, & Weil, 2005; Thakurta, 2009), with many of those 
companies ending up in bankruptcy status.  
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 The accounting information of these companies, which covered multiple periods of time and was externally 
audited, showed a healthy financial position and impressive performance.  Then weeks or months later, these 
companies collapsed, or in some cases, needed to restate their financial statements.  Thus, the fair and true financial 
picture had not been portrayed in the issued financial reports.  Also, the word scandal is used here because many 
related parties, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), external auditors and security analysts, who 
are concerned with financial reporting process and outcomes, had not raised their voices and warned the public in 
advance to take timely and appropriate actions before the revelations of manipulation surfaced and emerged. 
 
2. Sell-Side Security Analysts  
 
 As one of the gatekeepers, sell-side security analysts play this role. Sell-side security analysts normally 
utilize data from different sources to evaluate the company they follow before issuing investment recommendations 
to buy, hold, or sell its shares and formulate projections such as earnings per share and target price. Those sources 
include financial and nonfinancial issued by companies, its employees, trade publications, customers, suppliers, and 
general macroeconomic data level (Lorenzo, 2006; Sirri, 2004).  
 Further, Sell-side analysts are typically employed by brokerage firms, and most of these brokerage firms 
are investment banks (Newsome, 2005; Scianni, 2003).  In contrast to buy-side analysts who are typically employed 
by money management firms as mutual and hedge funds, and prepare research reports for their employers solely, 
sell-side analysts provide their research reports to their employers and their clients(Fogarty & Rogers, 2005). 
Therefore, sell-side analysts should exert every effort to provide independent, professional, and honest opinion to 
their clients and to public who entrusted them. In other words they should act as their agent (Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, 2005).  
 Hence, when fraud cases erupted, analysts among others have been severely criticized and blamed as the 
cases of Enron and WorldCom (Healy & Palepu, 2003; Ribstein, 2002; Sirri, 2004).  Even in many cases, sell-side 
analysts or their employers have been accused of intentionally, and contrary to their personal opinions, of hyping 
and touting intentionally stocks to land lucrative investing deals for their investing banking divisions and penalized 
hundreds of millions of dollars.  In 2003, and based upon what so called the Global Settlement Agreement, ten 
major investment banking firms, as Leman Brothers, in the U.S.  agreed to pay around $1.4 billion dollars of 
penalties and making structural reforms because of issuance of unreliable and incredible research reports by their 
analyst (Fuchita & Litan, 2006).  In 2003, Jack Grubman, who was working a well-known telecommunication 
analyst at Citigroup, agreed to pay a penalty of $15 million and barred permanently form working in the securities 
industry because he issued deceptive recommendations (McGeehan, 2003; Scianni, 2003). 
3. Research Issue 
 
 Fraudulent financial reporting is unethical and has serious and damaging consequences on the financial 
markets. Shareholders lose their investments in terms of millions of dollars when stock prices fall down because of 
the revelations concerning those fraud companies, confidence of investors in financial markets is also lost and thus 
seek alternative investments other than financial markets, and potential job losses (Braddock, 2006; Crest, 2002; 
Nicholson, 2007; Perino, 2002; Thapa & Brown, 2007).  Further, whatever actions are taken to punish those violate 
security laws by issuing misleading financial data is conceived too late as to the victims of the fraudulent reporting 
game.  
 So, there is a need to investigate thoroughly the fraudulent financial reporting phenomenon from different 
angles.  One of these angles is to find out how sell-side security analysts process fraudulent financial reports and 
cope with fraud companies before the revelation of such sham practices.  In other words, sell-side analysts as experts 
and information traders in the financial markets and who process financial and nonfinancial data to provide 
investment advice are linked to the financial numbers game, and thus it is warranty to study the fraudulent reporting 
from this side and find out how this group of gatekeepers digest fraudulent data during the fraud periods when 
evaluating such fraud company\ies. 
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4. Literature Review  
     
 Many studies in various periods have shown steadily that security analysts are utilizing accounting data in 
their reports, though the extent by which analysts used such data is different from study to study.  Govindarajan 
(1980), Rogers and Grant (1997), and Abdolmohammadi et al.(2006) are examples of studies that have showed this 
utilization.  Generally, those studies highlighted the utilization in terms of quantitative sense. For example, what 
used in those reports.  Therefore, it can be inferred that sell-side security analysts are by and large utilizing 
accounting data issued by the companies they cover. 
 Concerning sell-side analysts and fraudulent financial reporting, some studies have shown that although 
analysts may signal implicitly that there are fraudulent reporting practices, yet they have not clearly stated that 
selected fraud companies are producing fraudulent financial reports. Other studies have shown that analysts failed to 
indicate that there are financial misstatements. For example, Dechow et al.(1996) and Cotter and  Young (2004) 
have shown that the number of analysts who dropped coverage of fraud companies before the revelation of such 
practices may indicate that they might discover such practices but withhold to reveal them in clear terms and 
expressions. While,  Griffin (2003) found that analysts have failed to uncover the misleading accounting data before 
it is become a public news. 
 
5. Research Method 
 
 Since that there is a need to understand thoroughly  how sell-side security analyst process and utilize 
fraudulent financial reports issued by fraud companies, qualitative content analysis guided by grounded theory 
approach, Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) version have been employed by this study.  This approach implies that 
major categories (high level theoretical abstractions) are not predetermined and derived from data collected through 
down-top mechanism of analysis.  Down-top style implies that analysis and conceptualization starts from the raw 
data level to identify low level abstraction of concepts, then uplifting the conceptualization abstraction process from 
those initial concepts derived to arrive at major categories that reflect the data collected pertinent to the phenomenon 
under investigation (Gurd, 2008; Kelle, 2007). Further, data collection and analysis are performed concurrently and 
directed by wh
should be based on the outcomes of the analysis process, therefore theory evolves through interplay of data 
collection and data analysis (Mansourian, 2006; Parker & Roffey, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Suddaby, 2006).  
 According to Strauss amd Corbin (1990, 1998), there are three types of coding;  open, axial, and selective 
coding. Thus, by utilizing these coding types the researcher ends up with a theoretical model that can explain the 
phenomenon under investigation.  However, In axial coding, there is a hot debate regarding the usage of what so 
of this model (Kanning, 2008; Legree, 2008; Mehmetoglu & Altinay, 2006; Perry, 2006) .  This model consists of 
several components. These are mainly causal conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, strategies, 
and consequences.  The major criticism to this paradigm is that grounded theory researcher should not force 
concepts or categories during the coding process to fit into a priori predetermined scheme thus significant concepts 
might be lost (Kelle, 2007).  
 
6. Fraud Case: Enron Corporation 
 
 Enron Corporation has been chosen for this study as a case study since it has committed fraudulent 
financial reporting as evidenced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing 
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Enforcement Releases (AAERs).  According to those AAERs, The fraud period of Enron is 1997-2001(AAER No. 
1617, August 21, 2002; AAER No. 1820, July 28, 2003; AAER No. 2056, July 13, 2004) .   
 On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and this filling was 
considered as the largest bankruptcy case in U.S. history up to that time and shocked the financial markets in the 
U.S. (Bealing & Baker, 2006; Grumet, 2002). This shock, in addition to other fraud cases as WorldCom, has led to 
the enacting of a new law called Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 (Perino, 2002; Thapa & Brown, 2007).  
 So, Enron as a fraud case was considered as a prominent and influential fraud case, and that is why it has 
been chosen for this research. Moreover, data available for this case is rich and comprehensive.  As a result, intense 
theoretical model can be developed to explain how did sell- side security analysts  process misleading accounting 
data issued by Enron during that long fraud period, i.e. 1997-2001. 
 
7. Data Collection 
 
 The main source of data for this study was sell-
of Enron, i.e. 1997-2001.  Those reports were downloaded from a database called Invetext Plus.  Additionally, 
financial media as Wall Street Journal have been utilized to enrich and support the coding outcomes of those 
 
 From Investext Plus database, it has been downloaded a total of 355 reports.  80 reports were excluded 
from the analysis, since they were credit rating reports, equity reports related to Enron subsidiaries as Enron Oil and 
types of reports as interviews transcripts with some of the Enron senior officers.  This implies that a total of 255 sell-
side equity reports were left for analysis. The details these 255 reports are shown in table 1.  
                                            
Table 1: Number of Sell-Side Security Analysts Reports (Enron) 
 
Month\Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  
January 3 11 7 15 10  
February 1 4 2 2 2  
March 1 0 1 2 5  
April 2 6 9 12 8  
May 1 3 2 2 2  
June 3 1 0 2 2  
July 3 5 12 12 7  
August 0 1 1 3 5  
September 1 2 1 2 3  
October 2 4 8 0 24  
November 2 0 7 3 18  
December 2 0 2 1 3  
Total 21 37 52 56 89 255 
 
 Those AAERs can be accessed through the SEC web site: http://search.sec.gov/secgov/index.jsp#queryResultsTop 
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8. Coding results: Re-Reporting  
 One of the major categories developed through the analysis process was Re-reporting. The implication of 
this major category is that analysts were getting data, accounting as well as other types of data, and, largely just 
reiterating what has been said or written without due analysis or discussion.  More specifically, they presented their 
analysis based upon the data provided by Enron without questioning or examining the data itself.  Therefore, to 
some extent, the analysts covering Enron were working as journalists.   
 This behaviour indicates that analysts failed to show fraudulent reporting of Enron, in the sense that if 
have been written or presented by Enron.   
 This major category is supported by three subcategories, which are behaviours or actions that have 
supported or led to the generation of this major category.  These subcategories are reporting results, various 
channels of contacts, and reliance of management. See figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
  
 
-  
8.1 Reporting Results  
 During the analysis process, it was noticed that analysts utilised reported accounting information issued by 
Enron without questioning the reliability of such data itself.  However, analysts publicly and widely acknowledged 
the fact that Enron lacked transparent accounting practices. 
 Paine Webber, July 13, 1999, re- ecurring diluted 
 
 A.G. Edwards, January 30, 2001, re- -quarter earnings, led by 
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resignation of Jeffrey Skilling on August 14, 2001, and included surprise results in October and financial media 
articles discussing the wrongdoings of Enron, analysts re-reported results issued by Enron without any indication 
that Enron might have committed fraudulent financial reporting or any other types of accounting manipulations, 
such as income smoothing.  
 Salomon Smith Barney, on October 16, 2001, re-
 
 UBS Warburg, October 17, 2001, re-
 
 Even after Enron had filed 8-K form to restate its financial statements from 1997 until the third quarter of 
2001 on November 11, 2001, analysts have re-reported this new data as if those new figures are acceptable and 
reliable.  They have re-reported items as areas of restatements.  An example of this is from Credit Suisse First 
Boston, who on November 16, 2001, re-reported: 
On November 8th, Enron filed an 8-K that provides information on certain related party transactions and a 
restatement of its annual financial statements for the four-year period covering 1997 through 2000 and also for the 
first nine months of 2001. (p. 3) 
 
CIBC World Markets, on November 21, 2001, re-reported: 
The key disclosures in the 8K (filed prior the recent 10Q filing) were related to consolidation of three off-balance 
sheet transactions, which required restatement of financial reports from 1997 to 2001. Further, the filing also 
elaborated on the $1.2 reduction in shareholders equity that was announced during the 3rd quarter conference call. 
(p. 3) 
 t the impact of these 
additional liabil
can be seen, this conclusion emerged very late, since it surfaced after Enron filled form 8-K to restate its financial 
statements and not before.  Add
 made no dramatic change of 
recommendation.   
 t period, 1997  2001, analysts practiced a process of 
re-reporting Enron-issued statements, without due care or scepticism , which means that not only did analysts build 
their analysis on accounting numbers issued by Enron, a company with weak transparency, they have not questioned 
or examined the numbers themselves. 
8.2 Various Channels of Contacts  
 Analysts have received different types of data from Enron, financial and non-financial.  They have received 
iews, strategy, and evaluation.  The data were obtained via 
conferences, and holding personnel meeting with management were identified as ch
reports.   
 It can be said that generally analysts were observed as re-reporting, and to a great extent, re-affirming what 
had been said in those meetings and gatherings.  This supports this subcategory being cited within this major 
category, re-reporting.  
 In what reads like a marketing document, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, in January 28, 1997, re-reported:  
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two-day sess
enable the company to lead the group and market. (p. 1) 
Paine Webber, on January 22, 1999, re-reported:  
After attending the full day analyst conference that included 
has evolved into the Blue Chip Energy Company. (p. 2) 
Dain Rauscher Wessels, on January 26, 2001, stated:  
The conference outlined several initiatives that should allow continued growth. At the beginning of the 
conference, management boosted its EPS guidance for 2001 to $1.70-$1.75 per share. We had already 
increased our 2001 EPS estimate to $1.75 after the earnings report last week. (p. 1) 
 
 
Management mainly discussed the issues relating to the LJM transactions and other partnerships in which 
ENE has similar interests. The company also attempted to assure investors that no further charges were 
coming and that no other hidden transactions exist. (p. 4)  
 
lieve the market is most likely overreacting to the news of the last few days, 
we have concerns that the company may face additional write-
accounting information manipulations in previous periods.  However, analysts have presented the above conclusion 
in a mild manner, given the context of the situation then, and no elaboration or further details were given regarding 
financial reporting was discerned by well known financial media, such as the Wall Street Journal (mentioned in the 
financial reporting (mentioned in the report as well, (p. 5)).  However, in the same report, analysts re-reported the 
16, Enron reported th
In that third quarter, Enron has changed it earnings by $1.01 billion, which led to reported losses of $618 million 
 $1.2 billion.  Therefore, in their analysis, analysts focused and evaluated 
Enron on recurring earnings, not bottom line earnings that included those nonrecurring items. 
 Hence, analysts who authored the above reports can be viewed, because of the surrounding circumstances 
-reporting the already emerged and public issues 
and not uncovering hidden issues. 
8.3 Reliance on Management 
  management was with and 
manner of general acceptance and they re-reported accordingly. 
 The critical point here is not the argument of whether it was correct or otherwise to re-report, but rather that 
analysts practiced this reporting with general approval.  Based on this view, this subcategory was classified as part 
of the major category, re-reporting.   
 
Prudential Securities Incorporated, who on April 15, 1997, re-reported an 
goal of 10-15% reported earnings growth, our expectations are at the low end  
 
that growth in non-regulated energy markets and growth in so-called network revenue and income must drive higher 
returns on inv  
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 8 
 
 
 A.G. Edwards, -reported:  
Management stressed that it is a logistics company and not a trading company... For example, ENE might 
meet a sharp increase in the demand for electricity in Chicago by 1) buying wholesale electricity, 2) firing 
up a gas-fired peaking plant and taking gas out of storage, 3) exchanging coal for electricity, and 4) turning 
off a manufacturing operations for a Retail Energy customer. (p. 5) 
 
9. Discussion of the Results and Formulation of Propositions 
 
 Security analysts are not reporters, in a sense that the reporter describes by and large what is happening.  
The analyst dives into a company, collects and analyses relevant data, quantitative or qualitative, public or non-
public information, and comes out 
ancial or nonfinancial data. 
 -reported the accounting information released by Enron.  They 
these numbers in their reports.  Further, analysts performed financial analysis based upon that data without paying 
attention as to the extent of credibility of the accounting information they were utilising.   
 It was noticed that financial analysis utilised in the a
share (diluted and basic), price/earnings ratio, book value per share, price/book value per share, cash flow per share, 
price/cash flow per share, debt to capitalization.  Also, analysts made some comparisons either with previous 
the impact of rapid growth and debt to capitalization ratio on the quality of the reported accounting information.  
 The lack of analysis suggests that when analysts utilised or re-reported the financial data issued by Enron in 
their reports, either by pure presentation or financial analysis, it meant that they considered the data to be reliable, 
otherwise they should have given the financial data a different treatment in their reports.  
 If the information base, from which analysts perform financial analysis and calculate ratios is misleading, 
then it is natural to expect outcomes to be inaccurate and misleading.  The impact of conducting analysis on 
inaccurate or misleading data is not only that the analysis and findings are useless, but it may also cause serious 
harm to recipients of such reports.  In particular, in this situation the investing public can be affected more than 
-
making investment decisions.  In addition, they may have their own sources of data regarding the companies that are 
covered by sell side analysts (Fogarty & Rogers, 2005; Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 2007).    
 Even credit rating agencies, such as S&P and Moody, have fallen into the process of utilising misleading 
f
 2001, based mainly on financial statements issued by Enron.  Such financial 
statements were used to compute ratios 
creditworthiness (Haldeman Jr., 2006).   
 Nevertheless, this does not mean the analysts were victims of using manipulated accounting information 
of its financial data was as early as 2000 (Baker & Hayes, 2005; Higson, 2001; Kastantin, 2005; Reinstein & 
McMillan, 2004; Reinstein & Weirich, 2002).  Moreover, many models have been developed by researchers to 
detect potential manipulation of accounting information and could have been utilised by sell-side security analysts to 
examine the status of financial statements issued by Enron or any other company they follow (Beneish, 1999; Lee, 
Ingram, & Howard, 1999; Persons, 1995).  It could even be suggested that due to conflicts of interest, such models 
were deliberately not utilised.  
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 9 
 Therefore, sell-side analysts should exert sufficient attention or even scepticism as to the reliability of 
accounting information of Enron before conducting financial analysis and come out with opinions which partially 
relied on such analysis (King, 2002).  According to Fogarty and Rogers (2005, p. 341) 
 
  Maybe that was why analysts, as experts and providers of investment recommendations, had been exposed 
to harsh criticisms and to new regulations since they utilised fraudulent accounting information, an extreme form of 
earnings management by Enron, for a long period, 1997  2001.  The criticisms occurred because the analysts re-
reported fraudulent financial data issued by Enron without due diligence and reasonable care. 
 -  management in, 
Prudential Securities Incorporated, January 
and who
without any scepticism or question. 
 However, this research did find some cases where analysts had formulated an evaluation different to those 
presented in Enron-led analyst conferences and shown a different point of view in the evaluation, against the general 
trend of analysts.  This implies that some contrarian analysts, who challenged the dominant analyst attitudes, were 
observed during the analysis process.  For example, after attending a conference, held on January 23, 2001 by 
 
showcased compelling growth and rising return platforms across all business units. We are increasing our 2001 
le A.G. 
Edwards, January 30, 2001, stated in relation to the same conference:  
on past successes and its unique position to expand market share going forward. Despite much higher estimates from 
the company, our internal models indicate a fair price for the stock in the low $70[latest trading price according to 
that report was $78.50] per share area. (p. 1) 
 
 
In general the majority of analysts not only re-reported what Enron was stating, but also, they developed their 
opinions upon those statements.  As such, their opinions were lacking critical analysis and a sceptical attitude of the 
information mentioned in those meetings and conferences. 
 Also, in some major events, analysts repeated w
example, when chief executive officer (CEO) Jeffrey Skilling resigned on August 14, 2001 and claimed that his 
resignation was due to personal reasons, analysts repeated this justification in their reports.  They just mentioned the 
 
Management was adamant that there are no hidden or undisclosed issues at Enron (such as other shoes to drop) 
tha
earnings guidance (UBS Warburg, August 15, 2001, p. 1).  
In the same report, UBS Warburg stated,  
Mr. Skilling was a core force in the evolution of Enron (and open markets) over the past decade and the recent 
turn of events can not all be placed on his watch. We wish him well and hope he enjoys the time and money he has 
worked hard to create (p. 1). 
It seems that analysts, with their array of resources and corporate management connections, did not investigate 
this event and concurred with 
press, in this case the Wall Street Journal, as the story regarding the third quarter results released by Enron on 
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October 16, 2001, was initially reported by the Wall Street Journal, and not through analysts.  In that quarter, 
shareholder equity was reduced by $1.2 billion and Enron recorded its first time losses of $618 million in four years. 
 Sanders Morris Harris, stated on October 23, 2001: 
Current Events: Welcome To A Media Storm  
sorship of the LJMl and LJM2 (Cayman) partnerships. (p. 2) 
ran an article disclosing that ENE had written down $1.2 billion in equity as the company decided to repurchase 62 
Emshwiller, contained quotes by A.G. Edwards.  In their articles of October 17 and 18, 2001, the reporters shed 
li
previous date, that is, third quarter results of October 16 (Bost, 2006; Marken, 2003; Sherman, 2002).   
 
(Sherman, 2002)
transactions and their links to senior officers of Enron were suspicious, this was a red flag warning.  He then dug 
 
 Thus, sell-side analysts apparently have failed to act as analysts, and acted as reporters who did not bother 
to check facts.  Therefore, it is not surprisingly that they failed to show fraudulent financial reporting committed by 
Enron in the prolonged fraud period, 1997-2001.  Therefore, based on the findings of this research and relevant 
literature, the following propositions are presented: 
P1: It is likely that sell-side security analysts, who failed to show fraudulent financial reporting, to re-report 
selectively from the filed financial data of the fraudulent company without questioning the financial data itself. 
  
P2: It is likely that sell-side security analysts, who failed to show fraudulent financial reporting, to re-report 
corporate management releases of fraudulent financial information from media and conferences, without 
questioning the released information itself 
 
10. Conclusions 
  
 Analysts failed to show that Enron issued misleading financial data since they re-reported what Enron had 
reported without due care and scepticism.  This might raise ethical questions about their performance whether it was 
independent and objective or othe
to conflict of interests argument. However, this needs further research.  
 Sell- by adopting 
many measures.  For example, analysts might be held liable for their opinions regarding companies they follow, thus 
they will be more careful when formulate and issue their reports. Analysts might be exposed to standards to guide 
their performance as the case with external auditors. 
 
11. Limitations and Further Research 
 
 The above coding results generated from sell-
of 1997-2001, and for that reason, those results are confined to those reports of the Enron case.  Nevertheless, they 
develop a more refined grounded theory regarding the process of how sell-side analysts utilise fraudulent accounting 
information. 
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 The theoretical propositions developed in section ten, which offer tentative explanations regarding 
relationships between the failure to show fraudulent financial reporting of Enron and the re-reporting practice of 
sell-side analysts can also be the subject of further research and empirical testing.      
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